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ARTICLE
To Free or Not to Free? State Obligations and
the Rescue and Release of Marine Mammals:
A Case Study of ‘Morgan the Orca’
Arie Trouwborst,* Richard Caddell** and Ed Couzens***
Abstract
Wild animals periodically encounter difﬁculties or suffer injuries that require human inter-
vention and assistance. The natural assumption is that a surviving animal will, where viable,
be released back to the wild. But is there a formal legal obligation for a rescuer to do so? This
question arose recently in the context of ‘Morgan’, a female killer whale rescued in poor health
in Dutch waters. Morgan was successfully restored to full health, but the Dutch authorities
subsequently declined to repatriate her to the wild and, controversially, transferred her to
a zoological facility in Spain. This article examines the largely unexplored legal obligations
incumbent upon theNetherlands in respect of rehabilitated cetaceans, in the process exposing
certain problems of clarity and consistency within the present regulatory framework. By
necessary implication, this article identiﬁes emerging issues of interpretation posed by the
Morgan saga, illustrating the tensions between animal welfare and nature conservation –
especially in the transboundary context – and concluding ﬁrmly that the Dutch authorities
erred legally in making their ﬁnal decision.
Keywords: Marine Mammal Capture-and-Release, Orca Morgan, ASCOBANS, CITES,
Bern Convention, Habitats Directive
1. introduction
The fate of marine mammals that are lost, stranded, sick or injured often receives
signiﬁcant public and media attention. Common examples include orphaned seal
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pups, beached whales, and dolphins or porpoises entangled in ﬁshing gear. The enduring
anthropomorphic appeal of such species frequently generates strong interest in the plight
of individual animals: millions followed the attempted rescue of the northern bottlenose
whale (Hyperoodon ampullatus) that inadvertently swam into the Thames in 2006.1
Opinions on the most appropriate course of action in such cases nonetheless may vary
strongly.
Where a stricken animal is encountered, the competent authorities or other actors
involved may either refrain from interference, attempt to solve the apparent problem
in situ (by guiding a beached dolphin to deeper water, for example), euthanize the
unfortunate individual, or capture it (usually with a view towards its rehabilitation).
If an animal is captured, several outcomes are again conceivable, including euthanasia,
permanent captivity or release. The ultimate solution is, naturally, heavily case-dependent,
but is also strongly inﬂuenced by the viewpoints guiding the agencies involved.
Substantial differences may exist between a course of action that focuses primarily on
the well-being of individual animals and one with the predominant aim of healthy wild
populations. The wide range of viewpoints is amply illustrated with reference to
‘Keiko’, the killer whale (Orcinus orca) that ‘starred’ in the ﬁlm Free Willy – albeit
a specimen that had been intentionally captured for the entertainment industry, not
‘rescued’. Indicative of anthropomorphically-driven responses is the well-attended
memorial service held for the animal after it had succumbed, in freedom, to pneumonia
in a Norwegian bay.2 Whereas some viewed the returning to the wild as successful and
worthwhile, others considered the expensive repatriation operation proﬂigate and the
media attention exaggerated, while further constituents expressed rathermore industrial
preferences for the whale.3
Many species of marine mammal – a group primarily consisting of cetaceans
(dolphins, porpoises and whales) and pinnipeds (seals, sea lions and walruses) – are, to
a greater or lesser degree, protected under an array of global and regional instruments.
Hence, depending on the species and the state(s) involved, particular international
obligations may apply to actions aimed at the rescue of stricken animals and to their
fates after capture. The scope and application of these obligations may, however,
become apparent only after careful scrutiny.
The situation of ‘Morgan’ presents an opportunity to scrutinize such potentially
applicable international rules, the relationship between them, their application in
a national context, and the respective roles of diverse actors – varying from national
executives and the judiciary to scientists, private businesses and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). TheMorgan case throws into sharp focus the need for clarity in
regulatory regimes. Accordingly, this article seeks to identify, evaluate and interpret
the international legal framework applicable to the rescue, rehabilitation and release of
1 M.P. Simmonds, ‘The British and the Whales’, in P. Brakes & M.P. Simmonds (eds.), Whales and
Dolphins: Cognition, Culture, Conservation and Human Perceptions (Earthscan, 2011), pp. 56–75,
at 56–57.
2 ‘Oregonians Bid Farewell to Keiko’, Associated Press, 21 Feb. 2004.
3 NorwegianMP Steinar Bastesen, cited inM.McCarthy, ‘Turn Keiko intoMeatballs’, The Independent,
15 Sept. 1998.
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marinemammals in the context of the ‘Morgan’ affair. Themost contentious issue, and
the central question guiding the analysis, is whether such an animal ought to be
returned to the wild upon recovery. In this article, we conclude that, absent concerns
over communicable diseases, meaningful efforts must be made to do so.
2. the ‘morgan’ saga
On 23 June 2010 a severely emaciated juvenile killer whale was observed in distress
within the Dutch segment of the Wadden Sea.4 The nearest areas commonly frequented
by killer whales are to the north and west of the British Isles and in the Bay of Biscay.5
In the southern part of the North Sea, killer whales are vagrants. Observations in
Dutch waters accordingly are rare.6 An immediate rescue operation was organized by
the Dolﬁnarium Harderwijk and its afﬁliate SOS Dolﬁjn, in consultation with the
NetherlandsMinistry of Agriculture, Nature, and FoodQuality (LNV).7 The animal, a
young female subsequently christened ‘Morgan’, was found to be severely malnour-
ished but with no major injury or disease. Morgan rapidly regained full health in the
Dolﬁnarium. Attempts, which included genetic and vocal repertoire analyses, were
made to establish the animal’s origins. It was concluded that the whale most likely
belonged to a herring-hunting killer whale population in the Norwegian Sea, which
comprises an estimated 400 to 800 individuals. Initial efforts to identify and localize
the animal’s speciﬁc family pod proved fruitless. However, in September 2011 it was
claimed that fresh acoustics data indicated that the whale’s pod could be identiﬁedwith
77 per cent certainty.8
Although its originally stated intention was to return the animal to the wild, the
Dolﬁnarium formally abandoned this option in December 2010, based on specialist
advice that indicated that Morgan’s prospects for survivalwere essentially dependent upon
her rejoining her pod.9 The Norwegian killer whale population is largely composed of a
series of consistent and interdependent social units of speciﬁc individuals, an arrangement
that appears to be particularly important for females, which are not generally nomadic.10
4 The following factual account draws upon N. van Elk et al., ‘Expert Advice on the Releasibility
of the Rescued Killer Whale (Orcinus orca) Morgan’ (Dolﬁnarium Harderwijk and SOS Dolﬁjn,
14 Nov. 2010), available at: http://www.dolﬁnarium.nl/download/download_save.php?ﬁle516.
5 Within the orderCetacea, the species killer whale (or orca) belongs to the suborder of the toothedwhales
(Odontoceti), and is the largest representative within the latter of the familyDelphinidae. The species is
currently listed as ‘Data Deﬁcient’ on the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
Red List, meaning that insufﬁcient data is available accurately to assess its global conservation status:
‘Orcinus orca’, IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, available at: http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/
redlist/details/15421/0.
6 See K. Camphuysen & G. Peet,Walvissen en Dolﬁjnen in de Noordzee (Fontaine Uitgevers/North Sea
Foundation, 2006), at pp. 134–7.
7 Netherlands Ministries were restructured in 2010; this body is now the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Agriculture and Innovation (EL&I).
8 Free Morgan Foundation, ‘Morgan’s Extended Family has been Identiﬁed Acoustically’, 30 Sept. 2011,
available at http://www.freemorgan.org.
9 Van Elk, n. 4 above.
10 See A. Bisther&D.Vongraven, ‘Studies of the Social Ecology ofNorwegianKillerWhales (Orcinus orca)’
(1995) 4 Developments in Marine Biology, pp. 169–76.
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With the identity and whereabouts of her family group unknown, alongside perceived
practical difﬁculties with rehabilitation and release operations in the area of origin, it was
concluded that ‘Morgan therefore cannot be released and a proper location and setting for
keeping her under human care has to be arranged’.11 Subsequent efforts focused on ﬁnding
a location for permanent captivity, since the Dolﬁnarium Harderwijk was not considered
suitable, especially as no other killer whales were resident. In July 2011 the Dolﬁnarium
announced that it had identiﬁed an appropriate destination, namely the ‘OrcaOcean’ at the
Loro Parque, a modern zoological facility holding several killer whales on the island of
Tenerife, Spain.
The appropriateness of the decision to retain the animal in captivity has been
heavily disputed. In November 2010, the Free Morgan Expert Panel and Free
Morgan Release Support Group – now called the Free Morgan Foundation – elabo-
rated a programme targeting the whale’s eventual return to ‘the ocean environment,
her home range and her orca community’.12 Part of this initiative envisages her gradual
rehabilitation in a holding area on the Dutch southwest coast, which features semi-
natural conditions. This plan does not view the establishment of permanent social bonds
with other killer whales as a precondition for success. Instead, a successful repatriation
is deemed to beMorgan’s survival at sea, ‘ideally without further human intervention’.13
A second report, in July 2011, also trenchantly rejected the Dolﬁnarium’s assertions that
continued captivity represented the best interests of the animal.14
The fate of the Dutch ‘Willy’ has received global media attention and prompted
a series of legal actions and national and European parliamentary questions. Public
opinion on Morgan’s ultimate fate remains divided, ranging from organized agitation
for her return to the wild, to criticism that the current furore over an individual animal
obscures wider concerns over the degradation of the marine environment. Indeed
some, including noted biologists, have publicly advocated the need to ‘let vagrants die
in peace’.15
Neither view ultimately prevailed. On 30 November 2011, amidst tight security,
Morgan was airlifted to Tenerife where she remains at the Loro Parque facility.
Despite these developments, the Orca Coalition has reafﬁrmed its commitment to
repatriate the animal by launching a series of legal appeals. A judgment on the merits
of the case is likely to be of signiﬁcant interpretative value in future animal repa-
triation litigation, both in the Netherlands and abroad.
11 Van Elk, n. 4 above, at p. 28.
12 Free Morgan Expert Panel and Free Morgan Release support group, ‘Suggestions for Returning
“Morgan” the Orca (Killer Whale) to a Natural Life in the Ocean’, 3 Nov. 2010, at p. 3, available at:
http://www.freemorgan.org/uploads/1/3/8/6/13862255/morgan_release_proposal_v1.4.pdf.
13 Ibid.
14 I.N. Visser & T.M. Hardie, ‘“Morgan” the Orca Can and Should Be Rehabilitated: With Additional
Notes onWhy a Transfer to Another “Captive Orca Facility” is Inappropriate and Release is Preferred’,
Orca Research Trust, July 2011, available at: http://www.freemorgan.nl/Visser%20&%20Hardie%
20%282011%29%20MORGAN%20REHAB%20%28v1.1%29.pdf.
15 K. Camphuysen, ‘Laat Zo’n Dwaalgast Rustig Sterven’, NRC Handelsblad, 10 Sept. 2011 (translation
from Dutch by present authors).
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In contrast to the public debate thus far, this article is not overtly concerned with
the moral or philosophical considerations over the captivity of marine mammals.16
Instead, it concentrates on speciﬁc legal questions presented by the ‘Morgan’ affair and
the precise scope of the multilateral commitments engaged thereby.
3. the international legal framework
It has been argued that the rehabilitation of stricken marine mammals ‘currently lacks
a coherent central set of core values, ethics, or goals’.17 Although rescue techniques
have advanced signiﬁcantly since the 19th century – from when records memorably
indicate the administration of ‘a good glass of stiff brandy and water’ to a stranded
porpoise18 – attempts to regulate capture-and-release operations are relatively recent.
Rescued marine mammals traditionally constituted a convenient source of zoo
exhibits, which accordingly discouraged the elaboration of release programmes. By the
late 1970s, however, ethical and practical concerns had prompted a reconsideration of
these policies.
From a species perspective, rehabilitation efforts are generally considered to offer
modest conservation advantages, primarily because of their limited success.19 United
States (US) guidelines consider the overall health of wild stocks to be of paramount
concern,20 with the prospective introduction of diseases acquired in captivity a source
of particular anxiety.21 Few jurisdictions have adopted clear rules for the release of
rehabilitated fauna. Insofar as national regulatory systems exist, core guidance principles
seemingly include establishing clear criteria for assessing so-called ‘releasability’,
combined with monitoring initiatives;22 and such considerations should probably also
inform the international legal framework on animal rehabilitation. These principles are
also echoed in the work of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
(IUCN), which has designed broad guidelines for reintroducing wild animals.23 Speciﬁc
guidance for the release of marine mammals has not yet, however, been elaborated
within this forum.
16 On the case against the anthropogenic exploitation of cetaceans, seeM.P. Simmonds, ‘Into the Brains of
Whales’ (2006) 100(1) Applied Animal Behaviour Science, pp. 103–16.
17 M. Moore et al., ‘Rehabilitation and Release of Marine Mammals in the United States: Risks and
Beneﬁts’ (2007) 23(4)Marine Mammal Science, pp. 731–50, at 732–3.
18 Simmonds, n.1 above, at p. 63. The animal did not survive.
19 D.Wilkinson&G.A.J.Worthy, ‘MarineMammal StrandingNetworks’, in J.R. Twiss, Jr. &R.R. Reeves
(eds.), Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999),
pp. 396–411, at 401.
20 Moore et al., n. 17 above, at p. 734.
21 Ibid., at pp. 740–1; see also L. Quakenbush, K. Beckmen&C.D.N. Brower, ‘Rehabilitation and Release
ofMarineMammals in theUnited States: Concerns fromAlaska’ (2009) 25(4)MarineMammal Science,
pp. 994–9.
22 D.J. St. Aubin, J.R. Geraci & V.J. Lounsbury, ‘Rescue, Rehabilitation, and Release of Marine Mammals:
An Analysis of Current Views and Practices’, NOAATechnical MemorandumNMFS-OPR-8, July 1996,
at pp. 16–7, available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/health/rescue.pdf.
23 IUCN, Guidelines for Reintroductions (IUCN, 1998). The Guidelines are prepared in the context of
reintroducing species into areas of historical coverage, but provide lessons of broad applicability to the
present context.
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A number of international instruments which advance commitments that are, to a
greater or lesser degree, of relevance to the rescue, rehabilitation and release of marine
mammals, are considered below.24 In the speciﬁc context of Morgan, the instruments
considered are all in force in the Netherlands and are applicable to the Dutch sections of
the North Sea and Wadden Sea.
3.1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),25 popularly
dubbed the ‘Constitution of the Oceans’, advances a general but unconditional duty
under Article 192 that states ‘have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment’. The Parts of the Convention that engage the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) and the high seas both establish duties to cooperate that speciﬁcally apply to
marine mammals. Cetaceans are addressed, albeit obliquely, through Article 65 of the
Convention, which requires states to ‘work through’ the ‘appropriate international
organizations for their conservation, management and study’.26 It is often considered
that this phrasing tacitly tips the balance of objectives in favour of the conservation of
marine mammals.27 Moreover, the plural formulation of this provision has generated
sustained debate over whether multiple regulators may legitimately inﬂuence national
obligations concerning cetaceans, which has clear implications for the regulation of
capture-and-release programmes.28 While ambiguity surrounds the precise scope of
these obligations,29 the wording must at a minimum be regarded as a reference to the
International Whaling Commission (IWC). The plural formulation of ‘organizations’
has traditionally been viewed with some concern – especially the prospect of alter-
native fora usurping the role of the IWC in global quota-setting30 – although it could
24 On the legal protection of species in the North Sea generally, see A. Trouwborst & H.M. Dotinga,
‘Comparing European Instruments forMarineNature Conservation: TheOSPARConvention, the Bern
Convention, the Birds and Habitats Directives, and the Added Value of the Marine Strategy Framework
Directive’ (2011) 20(4) European Energy and Environmental Law Review, pp. 129–49, at 132–43. For
amore extensive analysis of the legal protection ofmarine species in theNetherlands, seeH.M.Dotinga&
A. Trouwborst, ‘Juridische Bescherming van Biodiversiteit in de Noordzee’, CELP/NILOS, 2008,
pp. 112–54, available at: http://www.pbl.nl.
25 Montego Bay (Jamaica), 10 Dec. 1982, in force 16 Nov. 1994 (28 July 1996 for the Netherlands),
available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los.
26 This provision applies mutatis mutandis to the high seas by virtue of Art. 120. Since the animal was
retrieved fromDutch jurisdictional waters, the pertinent provision toMorganwill be Art. 65 UNCLOS.
27 H.S. Schiffman, ‘The Competence of Pro-Consumptive International Organizations to Regulate
Cetacean Resources’, in W.C.G. Burns & A. Gillespie (eds.), The Future of Cetaceans in a Changing
World (Transnational, 2003), pp. 159–85, at 168–72.
28 P.W. Birnie, ‘MarineMammals: Exploiting the Ambiguities of Article 65 of the Convention on the Law
of the Sea and Related Provisions: Practice under the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling’, in D. Freestone, R. Barnes & D. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects
(Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 261–80.
29 See T.L. MacDorman, ‘Canada and Whaling: An Analysis of Article 65 of the Law of the Sea
Convention’ (1998) 29(1) Ocean Development and International Law, pp. 179–94.
30 D.D. Caron, ‘The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal
Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures’ (1995) 89 American
Journal of International Law, pp. 154–73. One potential alternative forum was created in 1992 – the
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), available at: http://www.nammco.no.
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also be interpreted as a reference to other relevant entities, such as the Convention on
the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)31 and its subsidiaries,
which have developed practices on rehabilitation issues.
As far as UNCLOS is concerned, while its provisions are of general rather than
speciﬁc relevance to Morgan’s case, the requirement for the Dutch government to
work in conjunction with relevant treaty bodies indeed appears to be ﬁrm.
3.2. The Convention on Biological Diversity
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)32 strives for the conservation of ‘biological
diversity’33 and the sustainable use of its components.34 Parties to the Convention have
committed themselves, amongst other things, to (i) promoting the conservation of viable
populations of species in their natural surroundings; (ii) promoting the recovery of
threatened species; and (iii) taking legal measures for the protection of threatened species
and populations.35 Indeed, the Convention’s primary emphasis in the ﬁeld of biodiversity
conservation is on these and other so-called in situ measures, which aim for the ‘conser-
vation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable
populations of species in their natural surroundings’.36 Conversely, ex situ measures
concern the ‘conservation of components of biological diversity outside their natural
habitats’.37 For instance, CBD parties undertake, as far as possible and as appropriate,
to adopt ex situmeasures ‘for the recovery and rehabilitation of threatened species and
for their reintroduction into their natural habitats under appropriate conditions’.38
Naturally, ex situ conservation measures are not intended to replace in situ conser-
vation action, but are rather to be taken ‘for the purpose of complementing in situ
measures’.39
3.3. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)40 was
adopted in 1946 ‘to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus
31 Bonn (Germany), 23 June 1979, in force 1 Nov. 1983 (also for the Netherlands), available at:
http://www.cms.int.
32 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 5 June 1992, in force 29Dec. 1993 (10Oct. 1994 for the Netherlands), available
at: http://www.cbd.int/convention/text.
33 Art. 2, ibid., deﬁnes this as ‘the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia,
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part;
this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems’.
34 CBD, n. 32 above, Art. 1.
35 Ibid., Art. 8(d), (f) and (k).
36 Ibid., Art. 2.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., Art. 9(c).
39 Ibid., Art. 9. On this inter-relationship see S. Harrop, ‘Climate Change, Conservation and the Place for
Wild Animal Welfare in International Law’ (2011) 23(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 441–62,
at 450–4.
40 Washington, DC (US), 2Dec. 1946, in force 10Nov. 1948 (14 June 1977 for theNetherlands), available
at: http://iwcofﬁce.org/convention.
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make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry’.41 As its title indi-
cates, the treaty was principally concerned with the regulation of ‘whaling’, and
therefore with the directed catch of whales. It is now argued that the scope of
the treaty has expanded over time, exempliﬁed by the introduction in 2003 of a
Conservation Committee.42 Nevertheless, this remains controversial, with some
parties refusing to recognize this Committee, while the wording in the Preamble
remains unchanged.
Difﬁculties are also raised by the precise status of killer whale stocks themselves.
Initially, the killer whale was not included in the species nomenclature accompa-
nying the Convention. Since 1977, however, it has expressly belonged to the list of
cetaceans over which the IWC exercises jurisdiction, and is within the scope of the
current moratorium (‘zero quota’) on commercial whaling.43 In 1980, the killer
whale was added to the species listed in paragraph 10(d) of the Schedule, which
states:
[n]otwithstanding the other provisions of paragraph 10 there shall be a moratorium on
the taking, killing or treating of whales, except minke whales, by factory ships or whale
catchers attached to factory ships. This moratorium applies to sperm whales, killer
whales and baleen whales, except minke whales.44
Notwithstanding the prohibition of the ‘taking, killing or treating’ of whales, including
killer whales, the scope of this provision is evidently limited – alsowith respect to ‘taking’ –
to whaling activities.45 Moreover, none of the decisions adopted hitherto by the IWC
address circumstances like those in the Morgan case.
To date, the Commission has not adopted a formal position regarding whales in
captivity. This is probably because, inter alia, most species covered by the ICRW
are simply too large to be kept viably in captivity. The demand for captive killer
whales has waned dramatically in recent years as a result of animal rights protests
and poor prospects for captive breeding.46 Hence, anthropogenic removals have not
reached levels for which the IWC would face political pressure to elaborate further
policies on this issue. Accordingly, the Convention does not impose concrete obli-
gations on the Netherlands concerning the capture and subsequent fate of Morgan,
which may ultimately lie outside the ICRW and within the realms of more speciﬁc
regulators.
41 Ibid., Preamble.
42 SeeW.C.G. Burns, ‘The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the International
Whaling Commission: Toward a New Era for Cetaceans’ (2004) 13(1) Review of European
Community and International Environmental Law, pp. 72–84.
43 In 1977, a deﬁnition of the species was included in the Schedule, which is an integral part of the
Convention Schedule, para. 1(B): ‘“killer whale” (Orcinus orca) means anywhale known as killer whale
or orca’.
44 ICRW, n. 40 above, Schedule, para. 10(d) (emphasis added).
45 Besides the formulation of para. 10(d) itself, which concerns actions by whalers, para. 1(C) points in the
same direction by establishing that ‘“take” means to ﬂag, buoy or make fast to a whale catcher’.
46 R.R. Reeves, B.D. Smith, E.A. Crespo & G. Notarbartolo di Sciara, Dolphins, Whales and Porpoises:
2002–2010 Conservation Action Plan for the World’s Cetaceans (IUCN, 2003), at p. 43.
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3.4. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora
Unlike other regulatory regimes, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)47 does not address ecosystem
considerations beyond the effects of unsustainable trade in endangered species.
Nevertheless, CITES does have considerable experience in addressing the trans-
portation of live animals48 and the analogous issue of repatriating conﬁscated
specimens. CITES lists a variety of marine mammal species in Appendices I (for
which trade is authorized only ‘in exceptional circumstances’49) and II (for which
trade is subject to strict regulation50). CITES is buttressed in the EU by Regulation
(EC) No. 338/97 on the Protection of Species of Wild Fauna and Flora by Regulating
Trade Therein (CITES Regulation).51 The EU provision lists killer whales in its
Appendix A as a species for which all commercial and translocation activities are
prohibited without prior approval,52 thereby prescribing a stricter regime than
CITES itself.
Indicative guidance on returning species to the wild has been developed under
CITES in respect of animals conﬁscated in illegal trade,53 calling for individuals to
be disposed of ‘appropriately’. To this end, particular importance is accorded to
the conservation status of wild stocks and ﬁnding a ‘humane’ solution to the problem.
The CITES disposal regime has been subject to little sustained attention to date. The
treatment of Morgan by the Dutch courts therefore provides illuminating insights into
the application of these provisions.
All indigenous mammals occurring in the Netherlands are regarded as protected
species under the 1998 Flora and Fauna Act.54 Accordingly, the capture and/or killing
of such species is in principle prohibited. The Dolﬁnarium Harderwijk holds an exemp-
tion under the Act permitting, inter alia, the keeping and transportation of cetaceans
for the purposes of ‘research and the protection of ﬂora and fauna, that is, rescue,
47 Washington, DC (US), 3 Mar. 1973, in force 1 July 1975 (18 July 1984 for the Netherlands), available
at: http//:www.cites.org. Orcas are listed in Appendix II.
48 See S.J. Fisher & R.R. Reeves, ‘Global Trade in Live Cetaceans: Implications for Conservation’ (2005)
8(4) Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, pp. 315–40.
49 CITES, n. 47 above, Art. II(1). From the perspective of marine mammals, this Appendix lists mainly the
great whales.
50 Ibid., Arts. II(2) and IV. All cetaceans not listed in Appendix I are so designated, alongside seals,
dugongs and manatees.
51 [1997] OJ L61/1.
52 Ibid., Arts. 8 and 9.
53 Resolution Conf. 10.7: Disposal of conﬁscated live specimens of species included in the Appendices,
available at: http://www.cites.org/eng/res/10/10-07R15.php.
54 Wet houdende regels ter bescherming van in het wild levende planten- en diersoorten, 25 May 1998,
Staatsblad 1998, 402. For a full appraisal of the Dutch legal context, see A. Trouwborst, ‘De Troebele
Regels rond deOpvang van Zeezoogdieren: EenAnalyse aan deHand van deCasus vanOrka “Morgan”’
(2011) 38(10)Milieu en Recht, pp. 653–68.
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rehabilitation, and release into the wild’.55 The conditions attached to this exemption
include the following:
Captured specimens of cetaceans (Cetacea) may be retained temporarily to enable
recovery, with the purpose of subsequent release. If release is not possible, such animals
may be retained permanently for the purpose of conducting research which is relevant
within the framework of obligations imposed by the EU Habitats Directive, the Bern
Convention and ASCOBANS.56
Stranded and captured animals must, as soon as possible after their rehabilitation (and,
as the case may be, research), be released in a suitable habitat as close as possible to the
place where they were found.57
Upon the capture of Morgan, the competent State Secretary conﬁrmed that this exemp-
tion justiﬁed the whale’s transfer to Harderwijk.58 Moreover, the Dolﬁnarium’s decision
not to return the animal to the wild was ofﬁcially sanctioned under this exemption,59 albeit
in the face of sustained dissent,60 including a series of Parliamentary motions.61
Under CITES, the international transfer of an Appendix II species requires the
grant of an export permit.62 In the EU, the CITES Regulation states that permits may
only be issued ‘in accordance with the requirements of other Community legislation
on the conservation of wild fauna and ﬂora’ – which is primarily a reference to
Directive 92/43/EC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and
Flora (Habitats Directive)63 – and, inter alia, when the specimens in question are
‘intended for research or education aimed at the preservation or conservation of the
species’.64 This is reinforced by the exemption granted to the Dolﬁnarium by the
Dutch authorities.65
On 27 July 2011, an EU CITES certiﬁcate which authorized the transfer of
Morgan to Tenerife was granted to the Harderwijk facility, ‘under condition that the
55 Exemption FF/75A/2008/064, 3 Feb. 2009 (translation by present authors; the original phrasing is:
‘onderzoek en bescherming van ﬂora en fauna, te weten opvang, revalidatie en het terugzetten in de vrije
natuur’). The exemption is valid for ﬁve years and is based on Art. 75 of the Flora and Fauna Act,
providing derogations from Arts. 9, 10 and 13(1) of the Act.
56 On these instruments, see below (Sections 4.2., 4.1. and 3.5., respectively, in text).
57 Exemption FF/75A/2008/064, n. 55 above, paras 8 and 9 (translation by present authors).
58 Van Elk, n. 4 above, at p. 5.
59 See, e.g., letter by State Secretary Bleker to the Dutch Parliament, 25 Mar. 2011, Kamerstukken II,
2010–2011, 28 286, nr. 496.
60 Questions MP Ouwehand on the situation of the rescued Orcinus orca, 25 June 2010, and answers
Minister Verburg, 13 July 2010, Aanhangsel Handelingen II, 2009–2010, nr. 2882; questions MP
Ouwehand on the release of killer whale Morgan, 14 Mar. 2011, and answers State Secretary Bleker,
21 Apr. 2011, Aanhangsel Handelingen II, 2010–2011, nr. 2299; questions MP Ouwehand on
disclosure of data on the rescued killer whale Morgan, 29 Apr. 2011, and answers State Secretary
Bleker, 25 May 2011, Aanhangsel Handelingen II, 2010–2011, nr. 2635.
61 Motion MP Ouwehand, 22 June 2011, Kamerstukken II, 2010–2011, 28 973, nr. 53.
62 Art. III(2).
63 [1992] OJ L206/7.
64 CITES Regulation, n. 51 above, Art. 8(3), chapeau and under (g).
65 Exemption FF/75A/2008/064, n. 55 above, para. 13: ‘[t]he exemption for bringing the animals
[to which the exemption applies] within or outside the territory of the Netherlands is valid only if
prior approval for this has been granted by the competent authorities of the countries involved, and the
necessary CITES documents have been provided’ (translation by present authors).
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animal will be kept for research’.66 The Spanish CITES authorities also endorsed the
transfer. It was initially postponed, however, because of litigation brought by the Orca
Coalition, an alliance of NGOs committed to securing the animal’s return to the wild.
In early 2011, this group also initiated an action against the EL&IMinistry for alleged
non-compliance with the Flora and Fauna Act and several international instruments.
The merits of both cases have yet to be deﬁnitively reviewed, although overtures have
been provided by the District Court of Amsterdam in two preliminary injunction
decisions.
The ﬁrst of these was delivered in August 2011.67 As an interim measure, the court
provisionally blocked the transfer of the killer whale to Tenerife by suspending the EU
CITES certiﬁcate until six weeks after the State Secretary’s decision on the Orca
Coalition’s objections. Having accepted the validity of all previous expert reports on
the proposed treatment of Morgan, the court considered that the ultimate decision
should turn on ‘the questions of international law which have arisen’.68 Moreover, the
court ruled that the Dolﬁnarium should not be entrusted with the ﬁnal decision, being
‘a private party which may, moreover, have its own stakes in the affair’.69 Having cast
doubt both on the value of the proposed scientiﬁc research at Loro Parque, deemed ‘an
animal amusement park with commercial interests’,70 and the legitimacy of the State
Secretary’s decisions to endorse the killer whale’s captivity and transfer,71 the court called
on all stakeholders to facilitate a satisfactory solution. Shortly afterwards, pro-release
members of the European Parliament sought the opinion of the European Commission
on the legality of the EU CITES permit, suggesting that infringement proceedings may
ultimately be required against the Netherlands.72
The second decision of the court reversed the earlier position and authorized the
whale’s transfer to Spain.73 The tone and approach of the judgment are strikingly
different from the August judgment of the same court (but a different judge), afﬁrming
that the government ‘rightly used the wellbeing of Morgan and her chances of survival
as criteria when answering the question whether the release of Morgan after her rehabili-
tation represents a satisfactory solution’.74 International instruments received scant atten-
tion, but were nonetheless not considered to impose the use of different criteria.75 The court
expressly referred to the aforementioned CITES guidance regarding conﬁscated animals,
which:
66 Decision to grant EU certiﬁcate 11NL114808/20, 27 July 2011, p. 4 (translation by present authors).
67 Rechtbank Amsterdam, joined cases AWB 11/3441 BESLU and AWB 11/3640 BESLU, 3 Aug. 2011.
68 Ibid. (translation by present authors).
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Written question P-009807/2011 concerning the export of a wild orca from the Netherlands to
a Spanish theme park, 25 Oct. 2011 (K. Arsenis).
73 Rechtbank Amsterdam, joined cases AWB 11/5033 BESLU and AWB 11/5035 BESLU, 21 Nov. 2011.
74 Ibid., para. 4.7 (translation by present authors).
75 Ibid.
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should not be interpreted in such a way as always prescribing return to the wild, but
rather that the latter is only desirable under very speciﬁc circumstances. The wellbeing of
the animal is an important aspect in this regard.76
Despite observing the apparent preference of many killer whale experts for
a return to sea – including a notable reconsideration of opinions in favour of
release by the majority of the experts on whose advice the Dutch government
had formerly based its approval of permanent captivity – the court found that ‘it is
too uncertain whether Morgan has good chances of survival in the wild’.77
Moreover, the EU CITES certiﬁcate was considered valid on the basis that the
authorities ‘could reasonably reach the conclusion that Morgan is transferred to
Loro Parque for research and education aimed at the preservation or conservation
of the species’.78
The November ruling thereby conﬁrms that scientiﬁc research is subordinate to
other interests at Loro Parque – inter alia, that of education – but no longer seems to
consider this to be important. The judgment thus fails to acknowledge that the EU
certiﬁcate for the killer whale was issued exclusively for research purposes. The latter
circumstance, in turn, is undoubtedly a direct consequence of the conditions stipu-
lated in the Dolﬁnarium’s exemption, according to which permanent captivity of
rescued cetaceans is permitted exclusively for the purpose of scientiﬁc research.79
Interestingly, the animal could be affected if different conclusions are reached in
a future Dutch judgment on the merits, even though it has left the jurisdiction, as
there could be repercussions for the validity of the EU CITES certiﬁcate for the
original transfer. The EU CITES Regulation speciﬁes in this regard that a certiﬁcate
‘shall be deemed void if a competent authority or the Commission, in consultation
with the competent authority which issued the permit or certiﬁcate, establishes that it
was issued on the false premise that the conditions for its issuance were met’.80 The
viability of this position is likely to be addressed in the eventual ﬁnal judgment on
the merits.
3.5. The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals and Subsidiary Instruments
The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)81
addresses the conservation of migratory animal species.82 Parties to the Convention
76 Ibid., para. 4.6 (translation by present authors).
77 Ibid., paras 4.8–4.11 (translation by present authors).
78 Ibid., para. 5.8 (emphasis added).
79 Exemption FF/75A/2008/064, n. 55 above, para. 8.
80 CITES Regulation, n. 51 above, Art. 11(2)(a).
81 N. 31 above.
82 See R. Caddell, ‘International Law and the Protection of Migratory Wildlife: An Appraisal of
Twenty-Five Years of the Bonn Convention’ (2005) 16Colorado Journal of International Environmental
Law and Policy, pp. 113–56.
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agree to take action to avoid anymigratory species83 from becoming endangered84 and
to promote, cooperate in and support research relating to migratory species.85 In
addressing the conservation needs of migratory wildlife, the CMS adopts a two-tier
approach, distinguishing between species identiﬁed as ‘endangered’ (listed in Appendix
I to the CMS) and those considered to have an ‘unfavorable conservation status’
(assigned to Appendix II), with differing obligations and policies prescribed for each
category. Parties ‘endeavor to provide immediate protection’ for Appendix I species,86
and may conclude subsidiary instruments to address the long-term conservation and
management needs of Appendix II animals.87 The killer whale is listed in Appendix II.
ASCOBANS
One of the earliest subsidiary instruments under the CMS is the Agreement on the
Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and North
Seas (ASCOBANS).88 Uniquely, it applies solely to small cetaceans, encompassing the
waters of the Baltic, Irish and North Seas, and parts of the adjacent Atlantic Ocean.89
Under the Agreement, ‘small cetaceans’ encompass all species, subspecies, and popula-
tions belonging to the toothed whales (Odontoceti), except the sperm whale (Physeter
macrocephalus).90 Unlike the ICRW, ASCOBANS categorizes the killer whale as a small
cetacean. The species is therefore regulated by both treaties, albeit under different bases.
The creation of ASCOBANS was motivated, inter alia, by the poor knowledge base
and vulnerable conservation status of small cetaceans in the region.91 Parties pledge to
cooperate closely in order to achieve and maintain a favourable conservation status for
the species, subspecies, and populations involved.92 In particular, ‘each Party shall apply
[...] the conservation, research, andmanagementmeasures prescribed in theAnnex’ to the
Agreement.93 Besides duties concerning, inter alia, habitat protection and the mitigation
83 Deﬁned as being ‘the entire population or any geographically separate part of the population of any species
or lower taxon ofwild animals, a signiﬁcant proportion ofwhosemembers cyclically and predictably cross
one or more national jurisdictional boundaries’: CMS, n. 31 above, Art. I(1)(a). This remains a rather
artiﬁcial deﬁnition: the fact that particular species may frequently cross human-established frontiers does
not necessarily mean that it is inherently migratory in nature.
84 Ibid., Art. II(2).
85 Ibid., Art. II(3)(a).
86 Ibid., Art. II(3)(b). This entails a series of commitments to conserve and restore habitats, regulate
activities or obstacles that seriously impede or prevent the migration of the species and prevent, reduce
or control factors that are endangering or are likely to further endanger the species: ibid., Art. III(4).
87 Ibid., Art. II(3)(c).
88 New York, NY (US), 17 Mar. 1992, in force 29 Mar. 1994 (also for the Netherlands), available at:
http://www.ascobans.org.
89 ASCOBANS, ibid., Art. 1.1. The Agreement area was expanded in 2003, a development that ofﬁcially
entered into effect in 2008, to incorporate Irish, Spanish and Portuguese waters. As yet none of these
states have acceded.
90 Ibid., Art. 1.2(a).
91 Ibid., Preamble; see also Resolution 1.6: Agreements (Resolution adopted at the 1st COP of the CMS),
available at: http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop1/cop1_documents_overview.htm.
92 Ibid., Art. 2.1.
93 Ibid., Art. 2.2.
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of ﬁsheries by-catch and harmful underwater noise, the ‘Conservation andManagement
Plan’ contained in the Annex establishes the following obligation:
[w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, the Parties shall
endeavour to establish (a) the prohibition under national law, of the intentional
taking and killing of small cetaceans where such regulations are not already in force,
and (b) the obligation to release immediately any animals caught alive and in good
health. Measures to enforce these regulations shall be worked out at the national
level.94
Whereas the formulation ‘taking and killing’ in the English treaty text could generate
some ambiguity, the equally authoritative German and French versions clarify that
either action is prohibited; they are not cumulative.95 Furthermore, ‘taking’ is a concept
that is generally interpreted broadly in the context of international nature conservation
law. National laws have taken a similarly expansive view: for instance, the US Marine
Mammal Protection Act further incorporates the non-fatal harassment of individual
animals.96
Treaty-based deﬁnitions have tended to include all types of anthropogenic removal,
whether through directed hunting activities, targeted captures for aquaria or accidental
taking in the form of by-catches, providing a broad remit for regulatory action. An
example is the generous deﬁnition in ASCOBANS’ parent convention, which stipulates
that ‘taking’ comprises ‘capturing’, without restricting the latter term in any way.97
ASCOBANS lacks its own deﬁnition, and is therefore widely assumed to rely on the
CMS articulation where it does not advance a contrary interpretation of key concepts.
Moreover, the ASCOBANS text does not otherwise truncate the meaning of ‘taking’,
except to qualify that paragraph 4 of the Conservation and Management Plan in
the Annex applies to ‘intentional’ removals. Consequently, the prohibitions under
paragraph 4(a) are limited to the deliberate capture and/or killing of cetaceans – as
distinguished from the incidental removals, for instance in ﬁshing gear targeting other
species, which is addressed further in paragraph 1. The prescription under (b) appears to
be motivated primarily towards cetacean by-catches in ﬁshing gear. In any event, when
rescued on 23 June 2010, Morgan was evidently not ‘caught alive and in good health’.
A salient feature of paragraph 4 is that its stated prohibition of intentional taking
and killing is subject to only one exception, in the form of a reference to paragraph 2
of the same Annex. It concerns the performance of research ‘to (a) assess the status
and seasonal movements of the populations and stocks concerned; (b) locate areas of
special importance to their survival; and (c) identify present and potential threats to the
different species’.98 Such activities reﬂect the emphasis on habitat protection that
underpins the agreement, alongside concerns to improve the paucity of data that,
94 Ibid., Annex, para. 4.
95 The German version speaks of ‘Vorschriften’ in plural, and the French of ‘l’interdiction par la législation
nationale de la capture et de la mise à mort intentionelles de petits cétacés’.
96 ‘Taking’ under the Act ‘means to harass, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill any
marine mammal’ – section 3(13); codiﬁed at 16 U.S.C. x 1361 et seq.
97 CMS, n. 31 above, Art. I(1)(i).
98 ASCOBANS, n. 88 above, Annex, para. 2.
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rightly or wrongly, permeate the text of ASCOBANS.99 Paragraph 2 speciﬁes that
‘studies should exclude the killing of animals and include the release in good health of
animals captured for research’.100 According to the text of paragraph 4, capture for other
purposes is not to be permitted. Consequently, ASCOBANS allows for signiﬁcantly fewer
exceptions than either the Bern Convention101 or the EU Habitats Directive.102 This is
not problematic per se, since the advancement of stricter protection measures by states is
expressly permitted under both the Convention and the Directive.103 Nonetheless, under
ASCOBANS the intentional capture of small cetaceans for the purpose of recuperation,
education, and research that does not ﬁt the description of paragraph 2 of the Annex, does
not sit comfortably alongside wider obligations under the Agreement.
The position of stricken cetaceans under paragraph 4 of the Annex is curious.
On the one hand, the provision calls for the prohibition of all intentional taking of
small cetaceans, except for certain narrowly deﬁned research ends; on the other, it
prescribes the immediate release of healthy cetaceans. The intentional capture of sick
or injured animals is covered by the required prohibition, except in cases of temporary
captivity for research purposes as detailed in paragraph 2. Sick, injured or otherwise
unhealthy animals that are taken unintentionally remain seemingly outside these consid-
erations. Since paragraph 4 is silent on their treatment, national discretion appears intact
in such cases. It is also peculiar that the Agreement apparently calls on states to prohibit
rescue operations of ill or injured cetaceans carried out with a view to their recovery and
subsequent release. After all, the recuperation of rescued animals would only seem to
enhance the conservation status of the populations involved, if they can be viably returned
to their ecosystems. ASCOBANS does not elaborate on the fate of animals once they have
been captured for recovery purposes.
When applied to the Morgan case it follows that, strictly speaking, an intentional
rescue operation to facilitate the animal’s recovery and subsequent release is in conﬂict
with the prohibition mandated by paragraph 4 of the ASCOBANS Annex. Furthermore,
the treaty is silent on the post-capture fate of rescued cetaceans. The tenor of paragraph 4
of the Annex, however, considered in conjunction with paragraph 2 and the objectives of
ASCOBANS,would appear to allow for only one conclusion: such an animal, particularly
when restored to good health, ought to be returned to the wild – just like healthy animals
caught accidentally104 and animals captured temporarily for research.105
99 For a critical discussion of the research-dominated tone of the ASCOBANS text, see H. Nijkamp and
A. Nollkaemper, ‘The Protection of Small Cetaceans in the Face of Uncertainty: An Analysis of the
ASCOBANS Agreement’ (1997) 9Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, pp. 281–302,
at 301.
100 ASCOBANS, n. 88 above, Annex, para. 2.
101 Convention on the Conservation of EuropeanWildlife andNaturalHabitats, Bern (Switzerland), 19 Sept.
1979, in force 1 June 1982 (also for the Netherlands), available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/
Treaties/html/104.htm.
102 N. 63 above.
103 Bern Convention, n. 101 above, Art. 12, and Art. 193 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU), Lisbon (Portugal), 13 Dec. 2007, in force 1 Dec. 2009 [2010] OJ C83/49.
104 ASCOBANS, n. 88 above, Annex, para. 4(b).
105 Ibid., Annex, para. 2.
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The conduct of scientiﬁc research does not seem to provide an obvious justiﬁcation
for keeping an animal in permanent captivity either. The research exemption applies to
activities undertaken for the ends outlined in paragraph 2 of the ASCOBANS Annex –
predominantly concerning ﬁeld research106 – and is conditional upon the repatriation of
any captured animals involved, when in good health.107 The national exemption granted
to the DolﬁnariumHarderwijk –which states that when release is ‘not possible’, rescued
cetaceans may be ‘retained permanently for the purpose of conducting research which is
relevant within the framework of obligations imposed by [...] ASCOBANS’ – appears
therefore to be misconstrued.108 This case raises particular difﬁculties since research
considerations have evidently become the ofﬁcial basis for the Dutch authorities to
justify the permanent captivity of Morgan and her transfer to Loro Parque.
Capture-and-release issues have commanded modest attention under the Agreement,
although the Morgan saga has prompted some reﬂection within the ASCOBANS
Advisory Committee (AC). In 2011, two contrasting documents were tabled before
the AC: the rehabilitation and release plan proposed by the Free Morgan Expert Panel,
submitted by the Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society (WDCS),109 alongside
a letter from theDutch authorities, contending that the animal ‘had no chance of survival
if she were to be released without knowing her family group’ and that ‘all legal proce-
dures have been followed’.110 The letter further stated that Morgan should be kept with
other orcas and at a locationwith facilities suitable for large predatory animals that place
an emphasis on public education.111
From a legal perspective, it is remarkable that the Dutch authorities made no
mention of national commitments under ASCOBANS, in particular paragraph 4 of
the Annex; the document only discusses national rules and decisions.112 It is notable
that research is not cited as a basis for permitting the capture and subsequent keeping
of the killer whale – an omission that should perhaps be understood in light of the
above conclusion that, under ASCOBANS, research cannot seemingly justify perma-
nent captivity. The only indicated motivation is the animal’s rescue, rehabilitation and
release, and subsequently – given the stated impossibility of such release – a contri-
bution to raising ‘awareness of the beauty of wildlife’.113
106 The explanation in the second half of para. 2 of the Annex clariﬁes that virtually all such research is of
a kind which is to be carried out at sea.
107 ASCOBANS, n. 88 above, Annex, para. 2.
108 Exemption FF/75A/2008/064, n. 55 above, para. 8 (translation by present authors; emphasis added).
109 ‘Suggestions for Returning “Morgan” the Orca (Killer Whale) to a Natural Life in the Ocean’,
AC18/Doc.8-01, available at: http://www.ascobans.org/ac18.html. On the Society generally, see
http://www.wdcs.org.
110 ‘WhyOrcaMorganCannot be Set Free’, AC18/Doc.8-02, available at: http://www.ascobans.org/ac18.html.
111 Ibid.
112 Compliance with national law cannot be invoked to excuse non-compliance with international
law, according to Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna
(Austria), 23 May 1969, in force 27 Jan. 1980, available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
113 ‘Why Orca Morgan Cannot be Set Free’, n. 110 above.
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A degree of ambivalence pervades the ASCOBANS response to this issue. Although
some parties suggested that ‘the sooner the animal could be released the better’, others
doubted whether the case ‘was a priority for the Agreement’.114 The WDCS was invited
to resubmit the issue for consideration at subsequent meetings ‘if it so desired’.115
Tellingly, capture-and-release issues were not formally discussed at the 19th ACMeeting
in March 2012, nor was there any reference to Morgan in the extensive Dutch report to
that Meeting. Rescue policies remain marginalized within the Agreement, beyond a
vague suggestion to consider preparing guidelines for the treatment of stranded cetaceans
within the framework of ASCOBANS.116 Such guidelines presumably would be based
upon those developed by ACCOBAMS (see below), although these endeavours may
perpetuate a ‘chicken-and-egg’ situation, given that the targeted rescue of small cetaceans
does not currently sit comfortably within the strict letter of the Conservation and
Management Plan. If parties do eventually wish to encourage such rescue operations, it
appears that an amendment of ASCOBANS, in particular of paragraph 4 of theAnnex, is
a precondition.
ACCOBAMS
Ameasure of guidance regarding the future treatment of cetaceans such asMorgan under
ASCOBANS may ultimately be forthcoming from the Agreement on the Conservation of
Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCO-
BAMS).117 This ‘sister’ Agreement applies to cetaceans both ‘large’ and ‘small’ within the
Black and Mediterranean Seas and the Atlantic waters contiguous to ASCOBANS. Killer
whales, including accidental visitors to the ACCOBAMS Area, are designated on the
‘indicative list’ (Annex I) of applicable species appended to the Agreement.118 While the
Netherlands is not eligible to accede to the Agreement, the receiving state, Spain, is a party
and is bound by relevant commitments in its treatment of Morgan.
Of particular relevance is a series of guidelines formulated under the auspices of
ACCOBAMS for the release of captive cetaceans into the wild.119 Like ASCOBANS,
ACCOBAMS prohibits the ‘taking’ of cetaceans,120 although anthropogenic removals
in emergency situations are expressly permitted.121 This is not surprising since the
conclusion of the Agreement was motivated signiﬁcantly by an epizootic morbillivirus
114 Report of 18th Meeting of the ASCOBANS AC, Bonn (Germany), 4–6May 2011, at p. 21, available at:
http://www.ascobans.org/ac18.html.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Monaco, 24 Nov. 1996, in force 1 June 2001, available at: http://www.accobams.org.
118 Ibid., Annex I. Under Art. I(5), Annexes to the Agreement ‘form an integral part thereof, and any
reference to the Agreement includes a reference to its annexes’.
119 Guidelines for the Release of Captive Cetaceans in the Wild, adopted through Resolution 3.20 (2007)
(the Guidelines), available at: http://www.accobams.org/index.php?option5com_content&view5article&
id=1134&Itemid5165.
120 ACCOBAMS, n. 117 above, Art. II(1); again the notion of ‘taking’ is not deﬁned within ACCOBAMS
and is broadly assumed to correspond with that of the parent convention.
121 Ibid., Art. II(2).
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that decimated stocks of cetaceans in these waters.122 The impact might have been
mitigated by coordinated quarantine and euthanasia procedures.123 The Guidelines
clearly envisage a presumption that cetaceans that have been taken into captivity for
whatever reason should be released to the wild where a certain degree of health has
been restored and environmental conditions at the release site are deemed ﬁt for the
release to be carried out.124
Paragraph 2.2 establishes extensive criteria to determine suitability for release. The
tenor of this provision suggests that cetaceans should be released unless the individual
is insufﬁciently healthy, is carrying communicable diseases, or has become so insti-
tutionalized and habituated to humans that enduring captivity is the only feasible
course of action. Indicative guidance is also established in respect of release logistics,
future monitoring and evaluative practices. Therefore, had Morgan been captured by
the authorities of a party to ACCOBAMS, it is unlikely that her extended period of
captivity would be legitimate. However, the scenario whereby a cetacean is transported
into the ACCOBAMS Area from external waters appears not to have been considered.
Instead, the Guidelines apply to the release of ‘captive cetaceans that originate from, or
are a result of breeding between cetaceans originating from, theAgreement area’.125 This
anomalous position engenders no commitment upon Spain to release Morgan to the
wild, having received the animal from theNetherlands. Had the animal been captured in
Spanish waters, however, the obligations to repatriate her upon recovery are clear and
unambiguous.
This idiosyncratic arrangement probably stems from the fact that capture-
and-release issues have largely involved cetaceans from the same region and between
ACCOBAMS parties. Indeed, Morgan is not the ﬁrst animal to be retained in captivity
by the state that nursed it back to health. In 2007, the Ukrainian authorities granted
‘several’ permits to remove stranded bottlenose dolphins from the wild to rehabilitate
them from sickness and trauma.126 To date, at least three healthy individuals remain
in captivity. As yet, no effective pressure has been brought to bear upon Ukraine to
return these animals to the wild, although this seems to be formally required under the
pertinent Guidelines.
122 W.C.G. Burns, ‘The Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and
Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS): A Regional Response to the Threats Facing Cetaceans’ (1998)
1(1) Journal of InternationalWildlife LawandPolicy, pp. 113–33, at 114; andACCOBAMS.org, ‘Threats’,
updated 3 July 2012, available at: http://www.accobams.org/index.php?option5com_content&view5
article&id574&Itemid564.
123 A. Aguilar & J.A. Raga, ‘The Striped Dolphin Epizootic in the Mediterranean Sea’ (1993) 22 Ambio,
pp. 524–8.
124 Guidelines, n. 119 above, para. 3.
125 Guidelines, ibid., para. 1.1.
126 Report of the 4thMeeting of the Parties to ACCOBAMS,Monaco, 9–12Nov. 2010, at p. 99, available at:
http://www.accobams.org/index.php?option5com_content&view5article&id51069:fourth-meeting-
of-the-accobamscontracting-parties&catid551:meetings-of-the-parties&Itemid565.
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The Wadden Sea Seals Agreement
Additional guidance is forthcoming from the Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in
the Wadden Sea (WSSA),127 another CMS subsidiary. This instrument, concluded two
years prior to ASCOBANS, concerns the protection of harbour seals and, latterly, grey
seals.128 It commits its parties (Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands) to prohibiting
‘the taking of seals from the Wadden Sea’.129 The only exceptions to this prohibition are
made for research purposes, under certain conditions, and also in respect of institutions
designated for ‘nursing seals in order to release them after recovery, insofar as these are
diseased or weakened seals or evidently abandoned suckling seals’.130
It is striking that the drafters of ASCOBANS did not adopt a parallel clause. Given
that all three parties to theWSSA assisted in drafting ASCOBANS, this appears to have
been deliberate. It should, however, be noted that theWSSA negotiations were strongly
inﬂuenced by the impact of disease (particularly phocine distemper virus (PDV)) on
Wadden Sea seal populations, in a manner similar to ACCOBAMS. The potential need
to cull or rehabilitate small cetaceans played no signiﬁcant role during the ASCOBANS
negotiations, hence capture-and-release issues were neglected.
For seals rescued under the WSSA, expert guidance elaborated in 1994 prescribes
a precautionary approach to rehabilitation and release.131 There is no absolute obli-
gation to rescue, as only animals with some chance of survival are considered to be viable
rehabilitation candidates. Moreover, live release should be sanctioned only if the animal
has been treated with particular medicines, is free from pathogens alien to the wild
population, and has not been held with mammals from outside the Wadden Sea. Seals
are to be released no later than six months from the date of rescue and in the areas from
which they were taken. This broad guidance represents a sensible model for any future
ASCOBANS initiative to consider.
4. regional provisions
4.1. The Convention on the Conservation of European
Wildlife and Natural Habitats
The Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats
(Bern Convention)132 is a regional nature conservation treaty operated under the
auspices of the Council of Europe. It addresses the conservation of wild ﬂora and fauna
127 Bonn (Germany), 16 Oct. 1990, in force 1 Oct. 1991, available at: http://www.cms.int/species/
wadden_seals/sea_bkrd.htm.
128 Although under Art. II(1), the WSSA applies exclusively to the harbour seal, the grey seal (Halichoerus
grypus) is also addressed by the treaty’s management plan adopted for 2007–2011.
129 WSSA, n. 127 above, Art. VI(1).
130 Ibid., Art. VI(2); the same provision adds that seals ‘which are clearly suffering and cannot survive’may
be killed by authorized persons.
131 ‘Conservation and Management Plan for the Wadden Sea Seal Population 2007–2010’, reproduced at
http://www.waddensea-secretariat.org/management/SMP/SMP%202007-2010.pdf.
132 N. 101 above.
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and their natural habitats in Europe, with particular attention to threatened and
vulnerable species.133 The killer whale is one of the 30 species of cetacean classed
as ‘strictly protected fauna species’ in Appendix II to the Convention. The Bern
Convention elaborates a clear duty to guarantee the special protection of Appendix II
species, requiring parties to take ‘appropriate and necessary legislative and adminis-
trative measures’ to this end.134 Appendix III species are subject to a lighter regulatory
touch, with a view towards ensuring that exploitation is managed in a manner that
would ‘keep populations out of danger’.135 For cetaceans, ‘all species not mentioned in
Appendix II’ are listed here, alongside harbour and grey seals.
For Appendix II species, Article 6(a) prohibits ‘all forms of deliberate capture and
keeping and deliberate killing’. This suggests that capture followed by the immediate
release of such animals is not necessarily precluded. The retention of these animals is,
however, clearly prohibited.136 The words ‘all forms of deliberate capture’, and the
absence of any limitation related to the purpose of capture, indicate that the prohibition
is intended to operate broadly. The possession and trade of Appendix II animals is also
proscribed under the Bern Convention.137
Derogations may be permitted solely when three cumulative conditions are met.
Firstly, the derogation must be motivated by one of the following interests:
d for the protection of ﬂora and fauna;
d to prevent serious damage to crops, livestock, forests, ﬁsheries, water and other
forms of property;
d in the interests of public health and safety, air safety or other overriding public
interests;
d for the purposes of research and education, of repopulation, of reintroduction and
for necessary breeding; or
d to permit, under strictly supervised conditions, on a selective basis and to a limited
extent, the taking, keeping or other judicious exploitation of certain wild animals
and plants in small numbers.138
Secondly, it must be clear that ‘no other satisfactory solution’ is available. Thirdly,
parties must warrant that ‘the exception will not be detrimental to the survival of the
population concerned’.
The ﬁrst criterion, ‘the protection of ﬂora and fauna’, seems to be a potential
candidate in the Morgan case. This clause is geared primarily towards avoiding
disproportionately adverse effects from one protected species on another.139 It could,
133 Ibid., Art. 1.
134 Ibid., Art. 6.
135 Ibid., Art. 7.
136 See also M. Bowman, P. Davies & C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (Cambridge
University Press, 2010), at p. 314.
137 Bern Convention, n. 101 above, Art. 6(e).
138 Ibid., Art. 9(2).
139 See also C. Shine, ‘Interpretation of Article 9 of the Bern Convention’, Bern Convention Doc. T-PVS/Inf
(2010)16 (Oct. 2010), at p. 6.
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for example, justify the capturing or killing of protected carnivores in order to reduce
predatory impacts on other vulnerable species. It should also support the removal of
sick and infectious individuals from a threatened population to mitigate the effects of
disease. If taken literally, this ‘open-ended’140 clause could justify the capture of a
debilitated Appendix II specimen, with the aim of furthering the conservation of the
species through that individual’s recovery and return to the wild. Such a link is, in
any event, expressly established in the national exemption held by the Dolﬁnarium
Harderwijk under the Dutch Flora and Fauna Act. Here, derogations were granted for
the purposes of (i) research, and (ii) ‘the protection of ﬂora and fauna, that is, rescue,
rehabilitation, and release into the wild’.141 The basis of ‘research and education’ is
also pertinent here, although it is evident that the initial capture of Morgan was not
motivated by these speciﬁc purposes. The same is true of the propagation defence,
which is also mentioned under this heading.
Regarding the absence of other satisfactory solutions, the principal alternative to
capturing the killer whale would obviously have been to leave it in situ, which would
probably have resulted in its death. If the conservation of the species, under the heading
of ‘the protection of ﬂora and fauna’, is deemed the proper basis for capturing the
animal, then it is debatable whether leaving the animal alone could have been justiﬁed
as a ‘satisfactory solution’. The second criterion thus initially appears to have been met.
This ostensibly ceased to be the case, however, when it was decided to keep the whale in
captivity indeﬁnitely. From the perspective of conserving thewild population, a debilitated
killer whale in thewater seems a perfectly satisfactory alternative to an individual removed
from its ecosystem never to return.
As far as the third criterion of Article 9 is concerned, aiding the recuperation of
a severely weakened individual would clearly not impair the survival of the killer
whale population involved.
Despite these considerations, there is some suggestion that the Article 9 test could be
bypassed in capture-and-release situations. This stems from a remarkable passage in
the Explanatory Report to the Bern Convention drawn up by the ad hoc Committee
that prepared the Convention.142 The explanation accompanying Article 9 elaborates,
inter alia, that ‘[i]t was considered that the taking or killing of protected fauna for
humane or humanitarian reasons was an accepted practice that did not require a speciﬁc
provision in the convention’.143 Evidently the Committee contemplated interventions
which, at the time, were considered so widely accepted that speciﬁc exemption clauses
for them were deemed redundant. The Explanatory Report applies the same logic to
actions in self-defence – such actions lie outside of the scope of the prohibition of Article 6,
even though this does not follow from the treaty text144 – and to ‘emergency cases where
140 Ibid.
141 Exemption FF/75A/2008/064, n. 55 above (translation by present authors; emphasis added).
142 Explanatory Report Concerning the Convention on the Conservation of EuropeanWildlife andNatural
Habitats (Council of Europe, 1979).
143 Ibid., para. 39.
144 Ibid., para. 31.
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exceptions would have to be made without all conditions [of Article 9] having been
fulﬁlled (e.g. the abatement of rabies)’.145
Assuming that the above explanation (still) represents a valid interpretation,
particular actions performed for ‘humane or humanitarian reasons’, which in principle
violate Article 6 of the Convention, would nevertheless be permissible without further
regard to Article 9. It follows from the Explanatory Report that this construction is
conﬁned to generally accepted actions, similar to combating notorious diseases or
wounding an unexpectedly aggressive animal in self-defence. It is not straightforward,
however, to identify ‘humane or humanitarian’ actions that presently attract little
controversy. One possibility is the mercy killing of a wild animal that clearly has no
chance of survival, an exemption that is widely applied in national law. Whereas this
may be relatively non-contentious, even the euthanasia of hopelessly suffering wild
animals remains controversial in some quarters. In other contexts, states (including
parties to the Bern Convention) have preferred to limit potential confusion by expressly
regulating the issue. Examples include theWSSA,146 ACCOBAMS147 and the Agreement
on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP),148 another CMS subsidiary
instrument addressing the conservation of seabirds.149 At any rate, the capture and
permanent captivity of charismatic megafauna is hardly ‘non-controversial’. Hence, all
things considered, it seems doubtful whether the reasoning of the Explanatory Report
provides a valid justiﬁcation for retaining rescued animals.
The Bern Convention does not offer advice on the release of rehabilitated animals,
although some guiding principles may be distilled from its institutional framework. In
1985, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a Recommendation
on the reintroduction of wildlife species.150 Although it predominantly addresses the
release of species into historically occupied habitats, parallels can be drawn with rehabili-
tation efforts. In particular, the Recommendation advocates an appraisal of the species’
prospects for success, ‘analysing in particular the possible repercussions of reintroduction’,
while releases should be prohibited ‘when adverse effects on the ecosystem are to be feared’.
This has been endorsed by the StandingCommittee to the BernConvention in its policies on
restocking populations.151 Again, this is analogous to capture-and-release situations and
mandates a preceding survey to establish that a reintroduction would be ‘effective and
acceptable’ and undertaken pursuant to pertinent IUCN guidance. Reintroductions are
also to be regulated to avoid ‘substantial damage’ to environmental interests and subject
to an assessment of ecosystem implications.
145 Ibid., para. 39.
146 WSSA, n.127 above, Art. VI(2).
147 ACCOBAMS, n. 117 above, Art. II(2).
148 Canberra (Australia), 19 June 2001, in force 1 Feb. 2004, available at: http://www.acap.aq.
149 ACAP, ibid., Art. 3(5): ‘Humane killing, by duly authorized persons, to end the suffering of seriously
injured ormoribund albatrosses or petrels shall not constitute deliberate taking or harmful interference’.
150 RecommendationNo. R(85) 15 of the Committee ofMinisters toMember States on the Introduction of
Wildlife Species.
151 RecommendationNo. 58 (1997) on the Reintroduction of Organisms Belonging toWild Species and on
Restocking and Reinforcing Populations of Such Organisms in the Environment.
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4.2. The EU Habitats Directive
The EU Habitats Directive152 seeks to ‘contribute towards ensuring biodiversity
through the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and ﬂora’ in the EU
Member States.153 The measures to be taken under the Directive ‘shall be designed to
maintain or restore, at favourable conservation status, natural habitats and species of
wild fauna and ﬂora of Community interest’.154 The killer whale is such a species ‘of
Community interest’ and is listed in Annex IV of the Directive, which addresses ‘Animal
and Plant Species of Community Interest in Need of Strict Protection’.
The Habitats Directive was adopted in part to implement the Bern Convention
within the EU, hence there are considerable similarities between their provisions on
species protection. Under Article 12 of the Directive, Member States shall take ‘the
requisite measures’ to establish a ‘system of strict protection’ of Annex IV species in
their natural range,155 prohibiting, inter alia, ‘all forms of deliberate capture or killing
of specimens of these species in the wild’156 and their ‘keeping, transport and sale or
exchange, and offering for sale or exchange’.157 The parallel provision to Article 9 of
the Bern Convention is Article 16 of the Directive, which ‘deﬁnes in a precise manner
the circumstances in whichMember States may derogate’158 fromArticle 12, ‘provided
that there is no satisfactory alternative and the derogation is not detrimental to the
maintenance of the populations of the species concerned at a favourable conservation
status in their natural range’.159
As under the Bern Convention, exceptions to the strict protection of such species
may only be allowed when three cumulative conditions have been demonstrably
fulﬁlled. Moreover, the scope for derogations under Article 16 is to be interpreted
restrictively, as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Commission
have stressed repeatedly.160 The burden of proving that these three prerequisites are
met rests on the Member State in question.161
Although there are differences in the formulation of the derogation conditions in
the Convention and Directive respectively, for present purposes they are of minor
152 N. 63 above.
153 Ibid., Art. 2(1). On the challenges of implementing the Directive within the marine environment, see
R. Caddell, ‘The Maritime Dimensions of the Habitats Directive: Past Challenges and Future
Opportunities’ in G. Jones QC (ed.), The Habitats Directive: A Developer’s Obstacle Course? (Hart,
2012), pp. 183–208; and Trouwborst & Dotinga, n. 24 above.
154 Habitats Directive, n. 63 above, Art. 2(2).
155 Ibid., Art. 12(1).
156 Ibid., Art. 12(1)(a).
157 Ibid., Art. 12(2).
158 Case C-6/04, Commission v. United Kingdom [2005] ECR I-9017, para. 111.
159 Habitats Directive, n. 63 above, Art. 16(1).
160 See, inter alia, the ECJ judgment in Case C-6/04, n. 158 above, para. 111; and European Commission,
Guidance Document on the Strict Protection of Animal Species of Community Interest under the
Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC, Feb. 2007, at p. 53, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
nature/conservation/species/guidance/index_en.htm.
161 Commission Guidance 2007, ibid., at p. 54; see also Case C-60/05,WWF Italia and Others v. Regione
Lombardia [2006] ECR I-5083, para. 34; Case C-76/08, Commission v. Malta [2009] ECR I-8213,
para. 48.
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signiﬁcance and are therefore not discussed. There is considerable congruence
between the two instruments as far as capture-and-release situations are concerned.
Accordingly, where Article 16(1)(a) of the Habitats Directive (which concerns the
‘interest of protecting wild fauna’) is engaged, it can in principle justify the capture and
keeping of an animal only on the condition that every effort will be made to return it to
its natural environment afterwards.
Article 16(1)(d) (which concerns ‘research and education’) is also of potential relevance.
Guidance from the European Commission associates derogations for research purposes
primarily with comparatively minor interventions, such as the brief immobilization of an
animal in order to attach a transmitter.162 Even so, it cannot be completely discounted that
Article 16(1)(d) could be invoked to justify permanent captivity when major research
objectives so require and those objectives cannot be attained in any other way. Again,
however, the initial capture of Morgan in June 2010 was not driven by any such motives.
It is notable that, in the conditions attached to the Dolﬁnarium’s exemption under the
Flora and Fauna Act, research considerations are categorically cited as justifying the
permanent keeping of animals that were originally captured for another reason (namely
the ‘protection of ﬂora and fauna’) should their release ultimately prove ‘not possible’.163
The use of one derogative ground fromArticle 16 of theHabitats Directive164 as a blanket
stand-in measure, or ‘Plan B’, lest another basis165 is no longer viable, raises doubts over
whether Article 16 has been applied in the requisite careful and restrictive manner. Such
a policy might, for instance, infer an artiﬁcial invocation of ‘research’ as justiﬁcation.
Incidentally, there seems to be little reason to assume the existence of an implicit
exception for actions for ‘humane reasons’ under the Habitats Directive. As with most
other pertinent instruments, the Directive appears to assign little signiﬁcance to animal
welfare considerations. Indeed, Advocate-General Kokott has questioned whether, in
connection with the condition of ‘no satisfactory alternative’, Article 16(1) of the Habitats
Directive provides a clear justiﬁcation for the killing of an Annex IV species in distress:
[a]t least in some cases, it will indeed be a satisfactory alternative to let matters take their
natural course, instead of stepping in and taking charge in order, in the ﬁnal analysis, to
give effect to human conceptions concerning dealing with animal suffering.166
4.3. The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the North-East Atlantic
A ﬁnal instrument of potential relevance is the Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention),167 through
162 Commission Guidance 2007, ibid., at p. 56.
163 Exemption FF/75A/2008/064, n. 55 above, para. 8.
164 Habitats Directive, n. 63 above, Art. 16(1)(d).
165 Ibid., Art. 16(1)(a).
166 Case C-6/04, n. 158 above, Opinion of A-G Kokott, 9 June 2005, para. 110. Incidentally, the issue had
not been raised by the Commission, and the ECJ itself did not address it.
167 Paris (France), 22 Sept. 1992, in force 25 Mar. 1998, available at: http://www.ospar.org.
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which parties undertake, inter alia, to ‘take the necessary measures to protect and
conserve the ecosystems and biological diversity of the maritime area’ in the northeast
Atlantic, including the North Sea.168 This formulation assigns a broad margin of
discretion to contracting parties in terms of the speciﬁc measures to be taken.Measures
aimed at the protection of species are, however, clearly envisaged. Moreover, the
discretionary margin has been gradually eroded with regard to particular species, by
virtue of recommended actions agreed through the OSPAR Commission.
A central role is reserved for the ‘OSPAR List of Threatened and/or Declining Species
and Habitats’ (OSPAR List).169 Even though this List and other decisions by the OSPAR
Commission are not formally binding, they arguably inﬂuence the interpretation of
associated treaty commitments. Threemarinemammal species are included in theOSPAR
List, namely the blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus), northern right whale (Eubalaena
glacialis), and harbour porpoise (Phocoena phocoena), for which recommendations
concerning capture-and-release operations could potentially be developed. The killer
whale does not occur on the OSPAR List; nor has it been the subject of species-speciﬁc
recommendations.
5. alternative legal approaches:
the animal rights dialectic
Recent litigation in the US has raised important questions over the applicability of
constitutional rights to animals, which could potentially inﬂuence capture-and-release
jurisprudence. Although the inherent rights of nature have been famously championed
in the US,170 European jurisdictions – and EU law171 – have provedmore circumspect to
the locus standi of non-human claimants. Coincidentally, a case ﬁled in California in
October 2011 – with judgment delivered in February 2012 – concerned ﬁve individual
orcas, held in captivity in two aquariums (SeaWorld San Diego and SeaWorld
Orlando).172 Intriguingly ﬁled by the ﬁve orca claimants, suing in their own names173
but represented by their six ‘Next Friends’ in the form of the organization People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and ﬁve individuals, the animals sought a decla-
ration that they were being ‘held by the Defendants in violation of Section 1 of the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits slavery
and involuntary servitude’.174
168 OSPAR Convention, ibid., Annex V, Art. 2(a) (in force for the Netherlands since 24 Aug. 2001).
169 For the latest version of the list, see OSPARAgreement 2008-16 (2008), available at: http://www.ospar.org.
170 C. Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ (1972) 45 Southern
California Law Review, pp. 450–87.
171 See P. Newell & W. Grant, ‘Environmental NGOs and EU Environmental Law’, in T.F.M. Etty &
H. Somsen (eds.), The Yearbook of European Environmental Law, Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press,
2000), pp. 225–52.
172 In the US District Court for the Southern District of California. See the ﬁled papers at http://www.peta.org/
b/thepetaﬁles/archive/2011/10/25/peta-sues-seaworld-for-violating-orcas-constitutional-rights.aspx.
173 The orcas are named Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka and Ulises: ibid, para 1.
174 Ibid., para. 1.
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The ﬁled papers then canvassed the complexity of orca society,175 describing their
communication skills, emotional interactions and intelligence, alongside the debilitating
effects of captivity on orcas.176 They also recounted the life histories of the ﬁve plaintiffs,
which had been in captivity for periods ranging from 29 to 43 years.
The orcas made two claims for relief from the court, in respect of slavery177 and of
involuntary servitude,178 both based on Section 1179 of the Thirteenth Amendment of
the US Constitution. The orcas submitted that Section 1 prohibits slavery and involuntary
servitude without regard to the identity of the victim;180 that Section 1 is not conﬁned
to African slavery, and that it embodies a longstanding principle that is ‘deﬁned and
expanded by common law to address morally unjust conditions of bondage and forced
service anywhere in the United States’.181
Perhaps not surprisingly, the court on 8 February 2012 granted a motion brought
by the defendant SeaWorld to dismiss the case.182 The court noted that there are ‘no
authorities applying the Thirteenth Amendment to non-persons’, and concluded that
‘the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to “humans” and therefore affords no redress
for Plaintiffs’ grievances’.183 Although the court accepted that ‘constitutional princi-
ples have been extended over the years to apply to changing times and conditions’ and
embody ‘fundamental constitutional concepts subject to changing conditions and
evolving norms’,184 it was held that the Thirteenth Amendment is ‘not reasonably
subject to an expansive interpretation’; and that it ‘targets a single issue: the abolition
of slavery within the United States’, with meaning being ‘clear, concise, and not subject
to the vagaries of conceptual interpretation’.185
The present article has examined duties accruing from various international
commitments; the SeaWorld litigation is therefore of indirect relevance. It is, however,
a timely reminder that many of the issues are likely to recur.186Many of the arguments
175 Ibid., paras 10–18.
176 Ibid., paras 19–27.
177 Ibid., paras 101–107.
178 Ibid., paras 108–111.
179 Which provides that ‘[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction’.
180 Filed papers, n. 172 above, para. 104.
181 Ibid., para. 105.
182 US District Court, S.D. California, Westlaw citation: 2012 WL 399214 (S.D.Cal.).; Jeffrey T. Miller,
District Judge.
183 Ibid., ‘Applicability of the Thirteenth Amendment to Plaintiffs: para. 3’.
184 Ibid., para. 4.
185 Ibid., paras 4–5.
186 The SeaWorld case was not the ﬁrst such case in the US. In 2004 the 9th Circuit Court (which includes
California in its jurisdiction) decided that ‘the world’s cetaceans’ did not have ‘standing to bring suit in
their own name under the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammals Protection Act, the National
Environment ProtectionAct, and theAdministrative Procedure Act’:TheCetaceanCommunity v.George
W. Bush, President of the United States of America; Donald H. Rumsfeld, United States of America
Secretary of Defense, US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, No. 03-15866, D.C. No. CV-02-
00599-DAE/BMK, ﬁled 20 Oct. 2004; 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). In this case, the cetacean
community (meaning ‘all of the world’s whales, porpoises and dolphins’) challenged the USNavy’s use of
certain sonar equipment which was allegedly injurious to them. This precedent may have prompted the
SeaWorld plaintiffs to found their action on an alternative basis (violation of the ThirteenthAmendment).
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made in the SeaWorld case could also be made in respect of Morgan,187 whose
prospects of a return to the wild will recede considerably with the passage of time.
Moreover, the SeaWorld case serves as a reminder that, as our understanding of the
emotional and other intelligence and the social relationships of marine mammals
increases, concomitant public pressure will be applied to authorities to secure
improvements in their care, if not their liberty.
6. conclusions
A number of international legal instruments advance commitments of relevance to
human interventions intended to aid stricken marine mammals. Reﬂecting trends
in domestic legislation, these provisions do not prescribe an unequivocal course of
action for the animal in question, while varying margins of discretion are conferred
on the rescuing states. Situations like the one involving Morgan appear to have been
unforeseen or neglected at the time of drafting, creating future interpretive difﬁculties
as rescue techniques become more advanced and rehabilitation becomes an increasingly
viable conservation tool for marine mammals from depleted stocks.
The overarching regulatory framework is slightly permissive and arguably ambiguous
on this issue. Some instruments, however, clearly serve to restrict the options available to
national authorities, such as CITES and the concomitant EU CITES Regulation 338/97,
although in principle they do not specify whether a rescued animal ought to be returned
to sea. More concrete objections to prolonged captivity arise under ASCOBANS,
ACCOBAMS, the WSSA, the Bern Convention and the Habitats Directive, presupposing
that the purported repatriation does not compromise the wider environment.
The Morgan controversy starkly exposes difﬁculties inherent in the present system.
The ASCOBANS text, which appears not to contemplate situations of this nature,
remains clearly problematic with cetacean rescue operations like Morgan’s at odds with
national commitments under theAgreement. TheBernConvention andHabitatsDirective
offer more immediate assistance in the present case, while ACCOBAMS and the WSSA
present regulatory models to follow in the longer term, if sufﬁcient political will can be
mustered. Claiming research purposes as the basis for the killer whale’s permanent
captivity raises questions in the context of theHabitatsDirective and the BernConvention,
and is evidently incompatible with the Annex to ASCOBANS. That the authorities have
opted for permanent captivity therefore appears legally problematic, themore so given the
stated reliance upon current international obligations to support this position.
This is compounded by the shifting justiﬁcation provided by the Dutch authorities
for continued human intervention. This has evolved from conservation considerations
to research initiatives, with the latter basis omitted from the ofﬁcial explanation to
ASCOBANS. That Morgan’s permanent captivity is now justiﬁed on educational and
welfare grounds ought to expose the decision-making process to searching review under
domestic administrative law, which may further clarify international and EU obligations.
Concerns must, however, be raised by the implications of the November judgment, which
187 Coincidentally, the orcas currently at Loro Parque originated from SeaWorld in the US.
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revised the tenor of the previous decision, andwas founded upon a CITES Resolution that
is not (directly) applicable, while disregarding the interpretive value of instruments that the
national legislation in questionwas intended to implement.188 Neither does the judgment
clarify whether subsequent research activities are ‘relevant within the framework of
obligations imposed by the EUHabitatsDirective, the BernConvention andASCOBANS’,
as required by the conditions of the exemption.189 It thus omits an essential consideration,
since permanent captivity for research purposes cannot be justiﬁed under ASCOBANS.
In the ﬁnal analysis, with human interventions now being relatively common, the
international legal framework applicable to the capture of stricken marine mammals
would beneﬁt from clariﬁcation of the procedures involved – especially concerning ceta-
ceans190 – through the IUCN, specialist treaties and/or further judicial interpretation of the
Habitats Directive. In the meantime, the Morgan situation remains highly unsatisfactory:
the capture and captivity of the animal is not only patently problematic in the light of
the Dutch commitments under ASCOBANS, but also troublesome from the perspective of
the BernConvention andHabitatsDirective. Indeed, the preceding evaluation provokes the
inescapable conclusion that the capture and keeping of the killer whale may have been
compatible with national obligations under these instruments – provided that clear efforts
were made to return the animal to sea, even if its prospects of long-term survival were not
deemed especially promising. Ultimately, this appears to be the strongest legal obligation
which can be identiﬁed in the matter of Morgan.
188 With regard to these instruments the judgment is limited to the general statement that the Flora and
Fauna Act constitutes part of the Netherlands’ implementation of its ‘European and international
obligations’: Joined cases AWB 11/5033 BESLU and AWB 11/5035 BESLU, n. 73 above, para. 4.7
(translation by present authors).
189 Exemption FF/75A/2008/064, n. 55 above, para. 8.
190 A similar case to that of Morgan’s could arise tomorrow in any state with a coastline.
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